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 1 Driving automation 
During the course of the 20th century, the automobile has grown from a humble horseless 
carriage into one of the most technologically advanced mass market commodities 
available.  In the first few years of the 21st century, we are starting to see a new 
generation of technology enter the automobile, in the form of driving automation. 
Of course, vehicle automation has been around for some time, with the first automatic 
gearboxes becoming widely available in the 1940s.  Indeed, the ‘auto-mobile’ itself is a 
holistic example of automation.  However, where traditional automatic systems have 
sought to assume the lower-level, operational components of vehicle control, new 
technologies are taking over more tactical and even strategic aspects of driving (cf. 
Ranney, 1994).  Thus our choice of terminology above – driving automation vs. vehicle 
automation – was quite deliberate, as we distinguish between low-level vehicle control 
and higher-level cognitive driving tasks. 
An automatic gearbox, then, largely carries out a mechanical, vehicle control task 
(though we accept that there is also some cognitive element regarding the decision to 
change gear).  Similarly, conventional cruise control (CC) simply adjusts the throttle to 
maintain speed.  On the other hand, adaptive cruise control (ACC) removes a cognitive 
task from the driver – perceiving the speed of a lead vehicle, deciding whether to adjust 
speed in response, and taking appropriate action.  Collision warning and avoidance 
systems (CWS/CAS) take this a step further, by making a potentially stressful decision 
about whether to take emergency action.  Even automatic steering systems (AS), which 
might appear to be an example of vehicle automation, relieve the driver of a significant 
cognitive workload (Young & Stanton, 2002), owing to the fact that steering is a second-
order tracking task (Wickens et al., 1998).  With more of these advanced systems being 
offered in mass production vehicles (e.g., Richardson et al., 1997), it seems that the 
automation is increasingly capable of taking over driving as well as vehicle control tasks.  
At present, the technologies are working independently of each other, resembling the 
architecture of early generation jet transports (Applegate & Graeber, 2005).  
Nevertheless, the degree of automation integration in road vehicles is increasing all the 
time, and full integration of these systems will make an autonomous vehicle a 
commercial reality.  Futurologists and ergonomics researchers alike are predicting that by 
2030 fully automated vehicles will be on our roads (e.g., Walker et al., 2001). 
Whilst the engineering of these vehicles seems on track, the understanding of the 
interaction between the computing, the vehicle’s behaviour and the driver’s reactions 
seems much less clear.  Where many drivers may be happy to relinquish control to 
automatic systems, others will still want the satisfaction of controlling their vehicles 
manually.  While we still retain a human in the loop, we need to consider how the design 
of the automation fits around the driver.  Fundamental human factors research in 
automation and human supervisory control spans over two decades (e.g., Bainbridge, 
1982; Hollnagel, 1993; Norman, 1990; Reason, 1990), but it is only more recently that 
we are catching up with research in vehicle automation (e.g., Stanton & Young, 2000; 
Young & Stanton, 1997). 
Much of the ideology behind driving automation has been around for some time in 
aviation systems, and there is considerable ergonomics knowledge about the promises 
and problems that can be extrapolated from the aviation domain (Billings, 1993; Stanton 
& Marsden, 1996; Wiener & Curry, 1980).  Some of that knowledge might give us cause 
for concern.  Indeed, Stanton & Marsden (1996) noted that automation has been 
 
 implicated in a number of fatal aviation accidents.  Root cause analysis by accident 
investigators has identified psychological factors such as boredom and inattention under 
conditions of low workload, cognitive strain under conditions of very high workload, 
failure of automated systems to meet pilots’ expectations, and over-reliance on the 
technology.  At the psychological level, none of these human factors problems is domain-
specific, and we can surely anticipate them with vehicle or driving automation.  Mental 
workload can be too high with the proliferation of in-vehicle systems, or too low as more 
driving tasks are assumed by the automation (Young & Stanton, 2002).  Equipment 
reliability with systems like ACC or CAS is reminiscent of similar problems in aviation, 
with direct implications for driver trust (e.g., Kazi et al., 2005; Lee & See, 2004).  Skills 
will fade if driving automation is relied upon to substitute manual operation.  In a critical 
situation, all of these problems could interact to cause safety consequences of the like we 
have already seen in aviation. The challenge for ergonomics is to ensure that driving 
automation systems are designed to avoid these problems while maximising the benefits. 
Many of these performance issues can be addressed by appropriate design of the 
automation.  Previous work in the general area of automation has often concentrated on 
how much control the automation should have over the task as a way of managing 
interaction with the human operator (e.g., Kaber & Endsley, 1997; Labiale, 1997).  
Taxonomic approaches to automation (e.g., Parasuraman et al., 2000) typically classify 
the technology along several levels from full operational control to simple decision 
support or task assistance.  By using strategic allocation of function decisions and mixing 
levels of control between the human and the machine, it is theoretically possible to 
manage mental workload, trust, and keep the driver in the loop to maximise the benefits 
that automation can offer. 
In this paper we suggest a slightly different emphasis to the solution.  Underpinning 
all of these levels of control, though, is a more fundamental question concerning the level 
of authority assigned to the automation.  If it is the ‘strong, silent’ type, it could cause 
problems for driver performance as it is unclear who is in control at any particular time, 
and therefore what appropriate actions should be taken.  At the macro level, this question 
represents our guiding philosophy when implementing automation – who has the ultimate 
power of veto, human or technology?  As we shall see in the next section of this paper, 
the answer to that question can have a profound influence on safety and performance. 
 
2 Learning from aviation 
In aviation, the two major aircraft manufacturers, Airbus and Boeing, have developed 
different philosophies regarding the authority of automation: hard automation (the Airbus 
philosophy) and soft automation (the Boeing philosophy). 
Airbus, in its fly-by-wire aircraft (A320/A330/A340 and the new A380 series) uses a 
‘hard protection’ system for its flight control systems, believing that the automation 
technology exists to prevent the pilot from inadvertently exceeding safety limits.  For 
instance, Airbus systems have hard speed envelope protection features that will prevent 
the pilot from stalling the aircraft and from pulling more than 2.5g even in an emergency 
(Hughes & Dornheim, 1995).  The rationale behind hard protection is largely to protect 
the airframe – if the pilot should inadvertently take the aircraft beyond its performance 
envelope, automatic interventions will prevent damage and maintain flight dynamics.  
Hard automation, then, employs the technology to prevent error; as such it has ultimate 
authority and can override the human operator’s inputs. 
 
 Boeing, on the other hand, opted for ‘soft protection’ in their 777 aircraft, using 
automation as a tool to aid pilots, and giving pilots full authority to override the 
automated systems if they want (or need) to.  The pilots therefore have access to the full 
performance envelope and will not be overridden by the automated systems.  There are 
still automated advisories in this soft protection scheme – if the pilot wishes to exceed set 
limits (such as exceeding 3.5 degree of bank, or pulling the yoke back as the aircraft 
decelerates below the minimum manoeuvre speed), s/he is required to apply more force 
than normal on the yoke (Hughes & Dornheim, 1995). 
Hard and soft automation therefore use a similar set of sensors and control devices, 
but to different ends.  Hard automation takes the pilot’s input, determines whether they 
are appropriate for the (assumed) situation, and if necessary takes its own action before 
passing the instructions on to the control surfaces.  This can be advantageous for some 
relatively simple tasks, like flight envelope protection.  A good example is if the pilot has 
received a collision warning and, in a panic reaction, pulls hard back to gain altitude.  
Without an associated increase in thrust, the aircraft would soon stall.  In that situation, 
the Airbus will itself apply all available thrust to climb without stalling.  However, there 
are circumstances in which this level of computer authority can cause problems rather 
than resolving them – problems which usually result from the context of operation.  The 
crash of an A320 at an air show near Paris in 1988 was caused because the automation 
had made an incorrect interpretation of the pilot’s inputs (Beaty, 1995).  Making a low-
level fly-by with the undercarriage lowered, the computer assumed the pilot wanted to 
land and so throttled back the engines.  To make matters worse, as the aircraft descended 
through 50 feet, many of the flight envelope protections were also removed when it 
automatically went into landing mode.  When the pilot attempted to pull clear, the 
necessary thrust was not available, and the aircraft plunged into woodland at the end of 
the runway (Investigation Commission of Ministry of Transport, 1989).  Clearly, the 
automation was unaware of the context of the flight (i.e., a low pass along the runway at 
an air show as opposed to a landing at an airport) and the intent of the pilot (i.e., not to 
land).   The pilot’s intent and the automation’s intent were not congruent. 
Soft automation makes a similar assessment of pilot inputs, but will only give 
feedback if the control requests appear to represent a safety risk.  If the pilot persists, the 
soft automation will then pass the inputs directly to the control surfaces without 
intervention.  Again, there are certain situations in which the pilot may legitimately wish 
to take the airframe beyond its performance limits.  An incident involving an engine 
failure on a China Airlines Boeing 747 in 1985 was only recovered after the aircraft had 
lost more than 30,000 feet in an uncontrollable dive (see Norman, 1990).  Needless to 
say, the airframe was significantly stressed during both the descent and the recovery, and 
substantial damage was caused (though only a few injuries were sustained on board).  
Interestingly, though, if that aircraft had been fitted with a hard protection system, the 
pilot would not have been able to recover control, as the necessary control inputs 
exceeded the performance envelope (although it could be argued that an Airbus flight 
control system would not have allowed the aircraft to get into such a situation in the first 
place).  Both philosophies have advantages, then, and naturally, both Airbus and Boeing 
think that their scheme is best (Hughes & Dornheim, 1995). 
In a coarse attempt to determine the relative merits of hard vs. soft protection in 
aviation automation, we have analysed all of the major (i.e., hull-loss) accidents 
 
 involving the modern automated1 type aircraft of both Airbus and Boeing over the last 20 
years.  These aircraft types are associated with the automated systems under discussion 
here, and thus provide a reasonable comparison between the two philosophies.  Table 1 
shows all those accidents which can be classified as automation related – i.e., as having a 
direct cause attributable to some mismatch between human and automated activities.  In 
table 2, we summarise those major accidents which are not automation related. 
 
Table 1: Automation related major accidents involving modern automated aircraft 
Date Aircraft Fatalities Location Description 
26/6/88 A320 3 Habsheim Paris air show (see text) 
14/2/90 A320 92 Bangalore Engines in idle descent mode on 
approach; fell short of runway 
20/1/92 A320 87 Strasbourg Confused descent mode resulting in 
controlled flight into terrain 
14/9/93 A320 2 Warsaw Runway overrun as windshear on 
landing affected automatic braking 
systems 
7/2/01 A320 0 Bilbao Heavy landing following turbulence 
on approach; crew attempted go-
around but automatic protection 
envelope prevented it 
30/6/94 A330 7 Toulouse Ground impact following test flight 
take-off due to misunderstanding of 
autopilot mode and overconfidence in 
aircraft abilities 
20/12/95 B757 160 Cali Hit mountain after confusion over 
directional beacon in flight 
management system 
6/2/96 B757 189 Dominican 
Republic 
Faulty airspeed indicator caused 
confusion with autopilot 
15/4/02 B767 129 S. Korea Struck mountain on circling approach 
after captain had taken over from 
autopilot and lost situation awareness 
 
With twice as many major automation related accidents being in Airbus aircraft, these 
data would seem to imply that the hard automation philosophy leads to more problems of 
human performance than the soft protection approach.  Even the Boeing accidents are 
only tenuously related to automation, as they were primarily problems of situation 
awareness following some fault on the flightdeck.  Also clear is an almost reverse trend 
on non-automation related accidents (Boeing: 10; Airbus: 6), and the fact that despite all 
of them being hull-loss accidents, many did not result in fatalities.  As we stated above, 
though, this is a coarse analysis, and does not control for absolute numbers of aircraft of 
each type, nor their range (which can affect accident statistics, as short-range aircraft go 
through more ‘cycles’ and are thus more prone to failure).  Nonetheless, as a baseline 
comparison this analysis appears to reinforce the conclusion that poorly designed 
automation can decrease safety and performance in operation. 
                                                 
1 For the purposes of this analysis, the aircraft types are Airbus A319/320/321, A330 and 
A340, and Boeing 737-600, -700, -800 and -900, 747-400, 757, 767, and 777.  Source: 
www.aviation-safety.net 
 
  
Table 2: Non-automation related major accidents involving modern automated aircraft 
(N.B. this table does not include the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks) 
Date Aircraft Fatalities Location Description 
10/3/97 A320 0 Abu Dhabi Take-off difficulties led to runway 
overrun 
22/3/98 A320 0 Philippines Thrust left forward on no. 1 on 
landing 
23/8/00 A320 143 Bahrain Crashed during go-around; autopilot 
disconnected on visual approach 
28/8/02 A320 0 Phoenix Poor reverse thrust control on landing 
21/3/03 A321 0 Taiwan Landed on utility vehicle 
2/8/05 A340 0 Toronto Runway overrun in poor weather 
4/11/93 B747 0 Hong Kong Runway overrun 
5/8/98 B747 0 Seoul Runway overrun 
31/10/00 B747 83 Taiwan Took off on wrong runway and hit 
construction vehicle 
2/10/90 B757 46 Guangzhou Hit by crashing 737 
2/10/96 B757 70 nr Lima Faulty instruments confused 
flightcrew 
14/9/99 B757 0 Costa Brava Stormy conditions and loss of visual 
references destabilised approach 
1/7/02 B757 2 Überlingen Mid-air collision after conflicting 
instructions from ATC and TCAS 
26/5/91 B767 223 Thailand Reverse thrust isolator failed and 
deployed during flight 
6/4/93 B767 0 Guatemala Runway overrun 
26/6/02 B767 0 Japan Tail strike during training touch & go 
 
The aviation industry has learned that high levels of automation autonomy, coupled 
with a great deal of automation authority could be problematical for the pilot (e.g., Sarter 
& Woods, 1994a).  In a complex, automated system the combination of autonomy and 
authority may combine to produce the illusion of perceived animacy.  Put another way, 
the automatic systems appear to develop a mind of their own.  A good example of the 
role of high levels of authority and autonomy in a complex system can be found in the 
China Airlines Airbus A300 accident at Nagoya, Japan in 1994 (Aircraft Accident 
Investigation Commission - Ministry of Transport Japan, 1996).  The aircraft was being 
flown manually on the approach (under flight director guidance) with the autothrottles 
engaged.  At some point during the descent, go-around power was accidentally applied 
by the First Officer.  This put the aircraft into an automatic (hard protection) go-around 
mode – it aborted the landing automatically – which caused a thrust increase and made 
the aircraft climb.  The autopilot was subsequently engaged with the go-around mode still 
active.  The pilots continued to push on the control in an attempt to re-initiate the descent 
into the airport, while the automatic systems in the aircraft wanted to climb.  In other 
words, there was a mismatch in intent, and the flightcrew ended up fighting the 
automation.  As the pilots applied down elevator, the aircraft compensated and tried to 
continue the go-around profile by applying opposite stabiliser trim.  At this point the 
alpha floor function (an anti-stall protection) activated, applying full thrust from both 
engines and thus increasing pitch angle.  The pilots elected to hold the throttles shut 
manually to re-initiate the descent.  Nevertheless, the aircraft began to climb steeply, the 
 
 nose passed through about 40° pitch angle and airspeed finally fell to about 70 knots.  
Consequently, the aircraft stalled and crashed, killing 264 of the 271 people on board. 
The Nagoya accident was one which began to raise concerns about the 
implementation of aircraft automation in the US Federal Aviation Administration, and in 
1996 it produced a landmark report on the difficulties that flightcrew have when 
interacting with flight deck automation (FAA, 1996).  The report made several 
recommendations at a systemic level, but primary amongst its concerns were the 
vulnerabilities in flightcrew management of automation, and situation awareness.  The 
differing implementations of automation can exacerbate problems of mode awareness – 
perhaps the most significant safety concern associated with the use of automation in 
commercial aviation (see Sarter & Woods, 1992, 1994b, 1995, 2000).   A lack of mode 
awareness has been linked with many aviation incidents and accidents and ‘surprising’ 
aircraft behaviour has been reported by many pilots when what were assumed to be 
‘hard’ protections have not intervened in the control of the aircraft (Sarter & Woods, 
1997).  Typically, an automated procedure (such as flight level change) could be 
overridden by a later flightcrew action (increasing the rate of climb).  This will cause an 
‘invisible’ mode transition, and the flightcrew might not notice that the original mode has 
disengaged until an error occurs (in this case, an altitude bust). 
Thus we see that, whilst hard automation may ostensibly cause more human factors 
problems, there are also issues with soft automation systems (and indeed, this 
classification may be more of a continuum than a dichotomy).  Even the FAA’s (1996) 
report stated that automation vulnerabilities were noted in varying degrees across aircraft 
type, manufacturer, and operator.  If anything, there is even more variability in the 
driving environment, vehicles and drivers than in aviation (Harris & Harris, 2004).  The 
aviation context is actually relatively simple.  Control of the aircraft in all three axes can 
be reduced to simple, mathematical equations.  There are many external aids for 
navigation and control of aircraft and interactions between aircraft are carefully 
controlled.  The road environment is far more complex.  Control of the vehicle per se is 
only one small part of the problem.  The relatively uncontrolled environment in which 
drivers operate (with impromptu and ad hoc interactions with other drivers and 
unexpected behaviour of other road users and pedestrians) makes this a far more complex 
environment into which to insert appropriate automated assistance. So we may wonder 
which philosophy is best for driving automation. 
 
3 Hard or soft driving? 
In anticipating the degree of vehicle automation that might become standard issue in 
2030, it is wise to consider the question of whether hard or soft automation provides the 
best solution for road vehicles, such as buses, lorries and cars.  As with the examples 
from Airbus and Boeing, hard automation will overrule the driver if he or she exceeds the 
vehicle protection envelope whereas soft automation will allow the driver to override it, 
and have access to the full operating limits of the vehicle. 
Before looking forward, though, let us review existing systems from this perspective.  
The automatic gearboxes already discussed are primarily categorised as hard automation 
– whilst the driver may usually make limited gear selections (e.g., the use of ‘kickdown’ 
or rudimentary gear lever settings), in the main the choice of gear is decided by the 
automation.  Anti-lock braking systems (ABS), traction control, and electronic stability 
programs (ESP) are similar – leaving aside the possibility to arm or disarm the system, 
 
 interventions are made purely on an assessment of the vehicle’s dynamics.  Their 
operation is almost transparent to the driver.  Conventional cruise control, on the other 
hand, can be classified as soft automation – the driver decides how and when to set the 
system, and can resume control at any time.  Previously, we identified these kinds of 
systems as constituting ‘vehicle automation’ (as opposed to ‘driving automation’).  On 
the basis of existing systems, then, there is a trend (though by no means exclusive) 
towards vehicle automation being synonymous with hard protection. 
Moving on to the novel technologies available at present and in the near future, ACC 
and AS represent examples of soft automation systems, in that they are fully selectable by 
the driver and any manual control inputs will override them.  Parking aids also provide 
visual and/or auditory assistance in a task that is still subject to manual control.  
Similarly, collision warning systems (CWS) offer ‘soft’ information and advice to the 
driver without necessarily assuming control.  It is proposed that in the near future these 
systems may be linked to automatic steering and braking systems for ‘hard’ intervention, 
producing what is effectively a collision avoidance system (CAS).  This is analogous 
with Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS), which has been mandatory 
in commercial aircraft for over a decade (see Harris & Smith, 1997, or Harris & Harris, 
2004, for a list of parallel aviation and automotive technologies).  Whilst TCAS has 
undoubtedly saved many lives, some of its early implementations actually provided 
resolution advisories that put the aircraft into greater danger.  Incidents have been cited in 
which TCAS advised a descent in an area of high terrain (e.g., Mellone, 1993) – 
revealing its lack of awareness, and again demonstrating the importance of context for 
hard automation. 
Likewise, intelligent speed adaptation (ISA) also represents hard automation.  ISA 
automatically restricts speed by linking GPS position monitoring and map databases of 
speed limits with the engine management system and/or the vehicle’s brakes.  It has been 
claimed (Carsten & Tate, 2005) that such a system could save up to 37% of all injury 
accidents.  However, serious concerns remain about its use.  Consider the scenarios in 
which a driver is overtaking a slow-moving or stationary obstacle, and part way through 
the manoeuvre the driver is confronted by an oncoming car.  Most drivers’ natural 
reaction (and in many cases the safer response) is to apply more throttle and elect to 
temporarily exceed the speed limit in order to avoid a collision.  Intervention of a speed 
limiter at this time could actually increase the risk of a crash.  The engineering solution – 
to incorporate an override switch – is unacceptable as this will inevitably increase 
reaction times in the intensely time-critical road environment (cf. Harris & Harris, 2004).  
An alternative ‘soft’ system using a haptic throttle (i.e., a throttle pedal that gets more 
stiff the greater the excursion from the speed limit – analogous to the Boeing 777 flight 
control system protection) was rejected as it ability to be overridden (by pressing harder 
on the accelerator) as this was thought to be a safety shortcoming. 
As with CAS, then, ISA illustrates that such hard protection systems are at best only 
partially context aware – a dangerous combination, as has been found on occasion in the 
aviation industry.  Furthermore, the ISA system may mis-interpret the intent of the driver 
when attempting to accelerate in a built up area.  The system may perceive the driver’s 
intent to be one of exceeding the speed limit (thereby representing a potentially unsafe 
behaviour) rather than avoiding an accident by taking evasive action (a safety promoting 
behaviour).  Whilst cost-benefit analyses (e.g., Carsten & Tate, 2005) seem to paint a 
positive picture, then, it seems that they are missing any potential dis-benefits of the 
system where the automated system may actually cause accidents.  It can be argued that 
 
 ‘hard’ protections are only appropriate where their application is not sensitive to the 
context of use (e.g., ESP or ABS) – in other words, what we have classified as vehicle 
automation. 
Both vehicle and driving automation systems can therefore be designed under soft or 
hard protection philosophies, and indeed there is a semblance of a pattern emerging in 
terms of automation strategies – hard protection for vehicle automation, and soft 
protection for driving automation.  Table 3 summarises the relevant technologies and 
classifications we have covered here. 
 
Table 3: Matrix of hard and soft automation categories against vehicle and driving 
automation types 
 Hard automation Soft automation 
Vehicle automation Automatic transmission 
ABS 
Traction control 
ESP 
CC 
Driving automation CAS 
ISA 
ACC 
AS 
CWS 
Parking aids 
 
On the basis of this classification and the assumptions from aviation, we might think 
that driving automation is heading in the right direction – if we take the view that soft 
protection is better for human performance.  We now need to evaluate whether we truly 
can extrapolate from the problems in aviation, as Stanton & Marsden (1996) predicted.  
Whilst automobile accidents are rarely investigated in the same level of detail as aviation 
incidents, there is a notable history of accidents involving vehicle automation, in the 
phenomenon of unintended acceleration (Schmidt, 1993).  Typically associated with 
automatic gearboxes (though also observed with cruise control), the problem occurs when 
drivers unwittingly hold their foot on the accelerator pedal rather than the brake when 
selecting gear.  Consequently, the car speeds off, and the driver – thinking their foot is 
already on the brake – gets into a state of cognitive lockup (Moray & Rotenberg, 1989), 
presses even harder, and the vicious circle only ends when the car crashes into an 
obstacle.  Furthermore, ABS, traction control, and ESP systems could all potentially 
change the driver’s style, encouraging them to ‘push the envelope’ as they know there is 
a safety net available.  As with aviation again, then, what was the last line of defence 
becomes the first point of control (cf. Billings, 1993). 
More recently, ergonomics concerns with automation have centred around the 
cognitive and performance implications.  Various researchers have looked at issues of 
mental workload, situation awareness, trust, and mental models (see Stanton & Young, 
2000, for a summary).  Generally, these concerns are focused on the higher-level driving 
automation systems, rather than vehicle automation.  So we may seek to classify these 
cognitive problems according to whether the system falls into the hard or soft automation 
category. 
Issues of mental workload have been identified with some soft driving automation 
systems.  Young & Stanton (2001, 2002) found that AS significantly reduced driver 
mental workload, and the consequent underload led to performance problems when the 
driver needed to reclaim control.  Nilsson (1995) also found that many drivers failed to 
 
 reclaim control from ACC in certain emergency scenarios.  Similarly, Landau (2002) 
suggested that a proliferation of driver support systems could overload the driver, thus 
nullifying any stress or satisfaction benefits of each individual system. 
Hard driving automation, on the other hand, is largely associated with problems of 
trust, situation awareness, and mental models.  If the system is designed to assume 
control with little input from or feedback to the driver, then the driver may have difficulty 
in developing an appropriate mental model of its operation in a given scenario.  Without 
knowing exactly how it might behave, the driver could become distrustful of the system 
(i.e., lack of trust) or even develop misplaced trust (i.e., overtrust or complacency; cf. 
Parasuraman & Riley, 1997).  Lee & See (2004) argue that it is critical for a human 
operator’s level of trust to be calibrated according to the genuine capabilities of the 
technology to avoid misuse and disuse of automation. 
Although we have again been somewhat coarse here, this analysis indicates that the 
range of cognitive and performance problems would seem to be more severe when 
implementing driving automation in the hard protection category.  However, the 
cognitive factors involved when interacting with automation are all interdependent 
(Stanton & Young, 2000), and so it is difficult to make generalisations on this basis 
without detailed further research.  The distinction between the relative merits of soft and 
hard protection is more blurred than in aviation, as significant problems can occur 
whether hard or soft, vehicle or driving automation.  Unintended acceleration (hard 
vehicle automation) has also been observed with cruise control (soft vehicle automation), 
while Young (2004) postulated that ACC could cause problems of uncommanded 
acceleration.  Furthermore, behavioural adaptation to ABS or ESP (hard vehicle 
automation) can also occur with ACC (soft driving automation).  Rudin-Brown & Parker 
(2004) found that drivers actively relied on the ACC system to keep a safe distance from 
the vehicle in front, rather than using it as the ‘comfort and convenience’ system for 
which it was designed (cf. Richardson et al., 1997).  Finally, the cognitive issues of 
driving automation seem to straddle both hard and soft systems, with potential safety 
consequences in both cases. 
Thus, whilst soft automation is generally favourable, we may need to develop the 
philosophy one step further for automobile automation.  Rather than revisiting existing 
levels of automation taxonomies (e.g., Parasuraman et al., 2000), we would like to 
suggest a whole new design philosophy to automation.  Once again, we borrow from the 
aviation domain as inspiration for this approach.  The concluding section of this paper 
summarises our thoughts and outlines this proposed design approach. 
 
4 A third philosophy 
Young & Stanton (1997) noted that ergonomics researchers are not going to stop the tide 
of vehicle technology – nor, indeed, would we probably want to.  However, rather than 
asking whether we should, we can have an impact on how such technology is 
implemented.  This paper has reviewed two philosophical stances to automation and has 
applied them to current and near-future vehicle technology systems.  We have derived 
two classifications of such technology – vehicle automation, in which low-level vehicle 
control aspects are automated; and driving automation, in which the driver is relieved of 
higher-level tactical or strategic tasks. 
Whilst we have noted that the distinctions are blurred between hard and soft 
automation on the one hand, and vehicle and driving automation on the other, when 
 
 focusing within driving automation it does seem that hard automation presents more 
problems than promises.  Different levels of automation offer different levels of 
protection in different contexts.  The driver needs to be aware of this, especially if mode 
changes are automatic.  For instance, Honda’s new Advanced Driver Assistance System 
(ADAS) links ACC with a Lane Keeping Assistance System (LKAS, similar to the AS 
discussed earlier).  This combination keeps the vehicle centred in the roadway following 
a vehicle in front at a set distance without driver input to the steering wheel or throttle – 
effectively analogous to a flight management system (cf. Harris & Harris, 2004).  In the 
ADAS system, three levels of automation are available to the driver: simple cruise 
control (automation has authority over the throttle); advanced cruise control, with 
automatic distance keeping to the vehicle in front (automation has authority over the 
throttle and brakes) and ADAS (where the vehicle has authority over throttle, brakes and 
steering).  However, it becomes obvious that not all automatic protections are available in 
all modes and as in aviation, the automated systems only work within well-defined 
parameters even when selected – which arguably caused the A320 crash at Habsheim (as 
the protection system did not operate below 50 feet altitude).   The ADAS system 
automatically transitions between modes, hence protections that the driver may think are 
in place are actually not available.  Automatic mode transitions were one of the principle 
concerns identified in the implementation of automation on the flight deck (FAA, 1996). 
Rather than an overarching philosophy of soft or hard automation for driving (as has 
been seen in aviation), a blend throughout the driving subtasks may prove most efficient.  
So, now we are thinking in terms of shared authority, rather than either human or 
technological authority.  The FAA’s (1996) recommendations emphasised the need for 
flightcrews to be informed about the relevance and authority of automation in different 
circumstances.  In other words, humans are being trained to compensate for the 
automation’s failure to act as a team player.  Dekker (2004) makes a similar point, noting 
that it is not the quantity of automation which causes the problem, but the quality.  
Instead of designing automation on a ‘who does what’ basis, successful automation 
depends on designers answering the question of ‘how do we get along?’  On the flight 
deck, such teamwork comes under the umbrella of Crew Resource Management (CRM; 
Wiener et al., 1993).  Rather than thinking of CRM purely in terms of liveware-to-
liveware or liveware-to-software (cf. Fitzgerald, 1997), though, why not also invoke it for 
software-to-liveware scenarios?  After all, as Jensen (1997) points out, CRM is all very 
well, but the first line of defence should be the design of the system, not the flight crew. 
In many ways, we are back to Norman’s (1990) problem of feedback, and the 
automation not acting as a human co-pilot (or co-driver) would.  If we are expecting the 
automation to behave as a team member – coordinating and cooperating with the driver – 
then we should apply notions of team performance to automation design.  That means 
effective communications, group processes, team decision making, leadership, shared 
situation awareness, conflict resolution, and recognition of others’ behavioural styles 
(Jensen, 1997).  Christoffersen & Woods (2000) suggest that the more powerful 
automated systems become (i.e., high in autonomy and authority), the more feedback 
they need to supply to make their behaviour observable.  From the human’s perspective, 
if the capabilities and activities of automation are more transparent (as would be expected 
of a human colleague), then the problems of mental models, workload and trust should be 
ameliorated.  Indeed, models of trust in automation have been built upon models of 
interpersonal trust in humans (Muir, 1994), so it seems logical to apply another aspect of 
human-human cooperation to human-machine cooperation. 
 
 This broadly agrees with the general opinion towards technological support systems 
rather than automated replacement of the driver.  Stanton & Young (2005) illustrate this 
with ACC, suggesting that instead of simply assuming the task of longitudinal control, 
the same radar technology could instead be used to provide enhanced information about 
time-to-contact – typically an area of variability and error in human judgement.  In this 
way, we would be using the capabilities of the technology to exploit the human’s 
strengths while compensating for their weaknesses – what Schutte (1999) refers to as 
‘complemation’.  Moreover, this soft philosophy is much more aligned to a socio-
technical systems perspective, whereby humans and technology cooperate as a team to 
achieve an overall goal.  Of course, we have seen that the reality is not as simple as that, 
with soft automation causing problems of mental workload which can be equally 
detrimental to performance.  In all likelihood, then, we will have to match different 
elements of the driving task with different philosophies for optimum performance.  In a 
sense, we have already begun, with traditional vehicle automation mostly falling into the 
hard automation category, whilst more driving automation systems seem to fit the bill of 
soft protection. 
Taking this one step further, if the automation can adapt its style to its human 
colleagues, the principle of complemation may be maintained.  For instance, the impact 
of CRM training is partly determined by the personalities of participants (Helmreich & 
Wilhelm, 1991).  One factor may be locus of control – whether people rely on external 
determinants of performance, or their own behaviour.  Rudin-Brown & Parker (2004) 
demonstrated that drivers with an external locus of control were more likely to trust the 
ACC system, and this slowed their responses to a simulated failure.  A human co-pilot (or 
driver) would be sensitive to such social dynamics and alter their behaviour accordingly, 
thus maintaining balance amongst the team.  The automated co-pilot should be designed 
to adapt in the same way.  In practice, this may mean revisiting some ideas of dynamic 
allocation of function or adaptive automation, which have their own set of problems (e.g. 
Scallen et al., 1995).  Nevertheless, treating the automation as a team member may put a 
different perspective on the attitude to design, but is perfectly in keeping with the systems 
perspective of ergonomics – both human and machine are working in harmony towards a 
common goal. 
Therefore it seems that on the face of it, soft automation fits much better with 
ergonomics principles and research than hard automation.  In closing, let us revisit the 
problems of automation identified by Stanton & Marsden (1996), to see whether a ‘soft’ 
CRM-designed system would hypothetically solve them.  The first problem of automatic 
systems is the shortfalls in expected benefits when introduced into the operational arena.  
In terms of vehicular automation, this could mean that they turn out to be less reliable 
(e.g., a collision avoidance system fails to detect an approaching object) or have an 
adverse impact upon human performance (e.g., automation seems to make the easy tasks 
boring and the difficult tasks even more difficult).  An openly communicative automated 
system, designed to support drivers under a soft protection philosophy rather than replace 
them, would certainly help here by optimising situation awareness and mental workload.  
Stanton & Young’s (2005) alternative perspective on ACC technology is a prime 
example here, and would even help drivers as a collision warning system with no further 
adjustments. 
Next, automatic systems can have problems related to equipment reliability.  In terms 
of vehicular automation, this could mean that drivers lose their trust in the automated 
systems (e.g., the driver prefers to choose the manual alternative), intermittent faults 
 
 could go undetected until the context becomes critical (e.g., the failure reveals itself 
immediately prior to the vehicle impacting at high speed into another vehicle) and the 
driver becomes so dependent upon the automated systems that they operate them beyond 
design limits (e.g., invoking ACC in non-motorway situations).  Whilst technical 
reliability is improving all the time, it would be unrealistic to expect a complemation 
system to be reliable 100% of the time.  Nonetheless, consistent communications would 
help the human to detect and intervene in a more timely fashion if and when the system 
fails. 
Thirdly, automatic systems seem to lead to problems related to training and skills 
maintenance.  In terms of vehicular automation, this could mean that driving skills could 
be stripped away through lack of practice by automation being in control.  This is likely 
to make the driver even more dependent upon the automated systems.  If drivers are not 
performing a function, how can they be expected to take it over adequately when the 
automated systems fail to cope?  This is where a CRM system comes into its own, as it 
plays to the strengths of each member of the team (whether human or machine), and can 
actually serve to develop the skills of the human by fostering an error-tolerant 
environment in which to learn (cf. Ivancic & Hesketh, 2000). 
Finally, automatic systems seem to induce errors in users.  In terms of vehicular 
automation, this could mean that design flaws lead to driver errors when interacting with 
the automated systems, for example specifying the wrong target speed and distance with 
ACC.  Of particular concern is the possible introduction of mode errors, which are most 
likely when controls have more than one function and the system’s mode is not 
transparent.  The A320 crash at the Paris air show was a prime example, and one which 
could have been prevented if both human and machine were more aware of each other’s 
intentions.  Once again, then, communication is the key, as we move from ‘strong, silent’ 
technology towards a cooperative, supportive system. 
From our analysis of automation in aviation, the problem of lack of coordination has 
emerged as a central issue (cf. Dekker, 2004).  We propose that allocation of function and 
automation design needs to explicitly examine coordination and cooperation between 
human and automated subsystems if the problems of automation in aviation are not to be 
replicated through automation in automobiles. 
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